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Several means may be employed by those who desire to avoid the
tax consequences imposed upon Frazell. The parties immediately may
elect to be excluded from the partnership rules through the statutory
procedure."5 The party contributing services may be granted a non-
operating interest since such an interest does not fit the general
partnership definition under section 761, or other language might
be employed to indicate that the agreement is to be strictly construed
as a sharing agreement. Finally, the draftsman may construct the
agreement so as to contemplate two distinct transactions: (1) the
contribution of developmental services for an oil interest, and (2)
the assignment by the service contributor of that interest for a period
of time to the grantor."
Frazell suggests one important drafting principle: contract pro-
visions pertaining to wages must be kept distinct from provisions
outlining contemplated sharing arrangements. If this separation is
not maintained, the latter will take on the character of compensation,
with the resulting unfavorable tax consequences.
John B. Esch
Taxation - Depreciation In Year Of Sale
Revenue Ruling 62-92
I. BACKGROUND
Depreciation deductions in the year of sale have recently been the
center of some controversy. Cohn v. United States1 was the first
case to disallow depreciation deductions on moveable assets in the year
of sale when the sales price exceeded the first-of-the-year adjusted
basis (i.e., depreciated cost) of the assets. The taxpayer in Cohn
operated three civilian pilot training schools during World War II.
Because of the foreseeable termination of the government's need for
civilian trained pilots, the taxpayer determined that for depreciation
purposes the useful life of his equipment should terminate at the end
of 1944. However, the taxpayer failed to set any salvage value on
his equipment. In August and November of 1944, the assets were
auctioned off at a price in excess of their adjusted basis at the begin-
" See the election provisions under the 1954 Int. Rev. Code, § 761(a).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 761(a).
" The drafting problem presented by Frazell is thoroughly analyzed in Galvin, Another
Look at Sharing Arrangements-Some Drafting Suggestions, Southwestern Legal Foundation,
Sixteenth Annual Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 453 (1965).
'259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).
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ning of 1944. The Commissioner disallowed a depreciation deduc-
tion computed without consideration of the asset's salvage value when
the amount of the salvage value (the sales price) was known. The dis-
trict court held that the depreciation deduction should have been
based on a salvage value of ten per cent of the cost' for the first two
years of useful life, but held that actual sales price should have been
used for the salvage value in determining the depreciation deduction
for the third and final year of useful life. This resulted in no depre-
ciation deduction for the final year since the actual sales price exceed-
ed the adjusted basis at the first of the year. Only the issue of salvage
value in the final year was appealed to the Sixth Circuit which upheld
the district court. The court reasoned that if an erroneous estimate of
useful life may be redetermined,' an adjustment of salvage value
should be allowed "at or near the end of useful life of the asset when
it is shown by an actual sale of the asset that there is a substantial
difference between what was estimated and what it [the salvage
value] actually is."'
II. REVENUE RULING 62-92
In response to a request on the applicability of Cohn to the 1954
Code, the Commissioner promulgated Revenue Ruling 62-92:
The depreciation deduction for the taxable year of disposition of an
asset used in the trade or business or in the production of income,
otherwise properly allowable under the taxpayer's method of account-
ing for depreciation, is limited to the amount, if any, by which the
adjusted basis of the asset at the beginning of the year exceeds the
amount realized from sale or exchange.'
Revenue Ruling 62-92 is a liberal interpretation of the Cohn hold-
ing; several instances may be noted where Revenue Ruling 62-92
oversteps the bounds of Cohn. First, the Cohn case authorizes a re-
determination of salvage value only if there is a substantial difference
in the estimated salvage value and the selling price of the asset,
whereas Revenue Ruling 62-92 authorizes a redetermination when
there is any difference. Second, Cohn allows such redetermination
at or near the end of estimated useful life; Revenue Ruling 62-92
applies whenever the asset is sold. Third, the Cohn case did not
authorize a redetermination of salvage value to reflect changes in
2 Id. at 375. Ten per cent was the normal salvage allowed for similar flying schools.
31d. at 378. Commissioner v. Mutual Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1947), held
that a redetermination of useful life might be made in the light of conditions known to
exist at the end of the period.
4 Id. at 378.
2 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 29.
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market value, but Revenue Ruling 62-92 requires the disallowance
of depreciation in the year of sale even if the sales price exceeds the
first-of-year adjusted basis solely because of market appreciation!
Revenue Ruling 62-92 has not enjoyed uniform acceptance in the
courts. After initially accepting it in Randolph D. Rouse,' the tax
court withdrew its support in Macabe Co.' The Eighth Circuit also re-
jected Revenue Ruling 62-92 in United States v. S & A Co.' On the
other hand, the Second Circuit endorsed the Commissioner's position
in Motorlease Corp. v. United States" and Fribourg Navigation Com-
pany v. Commissioner."
III. FRIBOURG NAVIGATION CO. V. COMMISSIONER"
In Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner the taxpayer, Fri-
bourg, bought a Liberty-type ship, the Feuer, on December 21, 1955,
to transport bulk commodities such as grain. Its cost was $469,000.
The taxpayer assigned the ship a salvage value of $54,000 and a
useful life of three years, both of which estimates were qualifiedly
approved by the Internal Revenue Service." The Suez crisis of 1956
abnormally inflated the price of ships, and the taxpayer was ap-
proached by a competitor with an offer to buy the Feuer. The offer
was accepted and the Feuer was sold on December 23, 1957, for
$695,000.
The taxpayer had depreciated the ship on the straight-line method
which resulted in depreciation of about $378.65 per day. At this rate,
the adjusted basis of the ship on January 1, 1957 (the first day of
the year of sale) was $326,627.73. In its income tax return for fiscal
(and calendar) year 1957, the taxpayer claimed a depreciation de-
duction of $135,367.24 for the time it owned the ship in 1957.14
' For a more detailed treatment of the taxpayer's contentions in this area, see Walther,
Depreciation in the Year of Sale: Recent Developments, 51 A.B.A.J. 281 (1965).7 39 T.C. 70 (1962).
842 T.C. 1105 (1965), presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
9 338 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3267 (U.S. Jan.
27, 1965) (No. 862) (the sale of a going concern).
10 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3192 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1964) (No. 685).
1335 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
" Ibid.
"3 The taxpayer applied for a ruling from the Engineering and Valuation Branch of the
IRS with respect to depreciation of the ship. The IRS ruled in a letter dated December 18,
1955, that it would accept a three year useful life and a $54,000 salvage value. The letter
also stated that estimated useful life was subject to change as experience might warrant and
that the ruling was not to be construed as binding as to useful life.
1, Period of Depreciation





This deduction was entirely disallowed by the Commissioner, even
though he had approved both the salvage value and the useful life
estimated by the taxpayer at the time of acquisition.
A. The Argument Supporting Allowance Of Depreciation In The
Year Of Sale
The taxpayer contends that the automatic disallowance of de-
preciation in the year of sale without regard to when the asset was
sold, or to whether the depreciation schedule was reasonable, violates
the judicial, legislative, and administrative authority which has de-
veloped around what is now section 167 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The allowance of depreciation in the year of sale was
so well established that it was seldom litigated prior to Revenue
Ruling 62-92.15 In the most important case on the subject prior to
Cohn v. United States, viz., Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co.," the Com-
missioner's attempt to deny depreciation solely because the sales price
exceeded the adjusted basis was disapproved. In Wier the Commis-
sioner equated the sales price to salvage value. The issue was whether
the fact that the price received from the sale of depreciated automo-
biles was greater than their combined adjusted bases, should preclude
a depreciation allowance. In answer to this question the court stated
that " 'it must be taken as settled that mere appreciation in value due
to extraneous causes has no influence on the depreciation one way or
the other.' ...
The Wier case also involved the question of the propriety of de-
preciation of a mill when the taxpayer had failed to prove the reason-
ableness of its estimated salvage value. Here, the depreciation deduc-
tion was correctly disallowed. Hence, the Wier case stands for the
proposition that the Commissioner may reject depreciation estimates
if the estimates were unreasonable when made, but depreciation de-
ductions should not be disallowed solely because the asset's market
value falls below the adjusted basis. At this point it should be noted
that the Commissioner in Fribourg is not questioning the reasonable-
ness of the taxpayer's depreciation schedule, but is questioning an
increase "normally associated with capital gain" due to a change in
market conditions caused by the Suez Crisis of 1956-57."s This
attempted denial of depreciation in the Fribourg case is in direct con-
flict with the principle established in Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co.
'5 For examples of early cases permitting a depreciation deduction in the year of sale,
see Ludey v. United States, 274 U.S. 295 (1927); Eldorado Coal & Mining Co. v. Mager,
255 U.S. 522 (1921).
169 T.C. 990 (1947).
17 Id. at 999.
"8335 F.2d at 18.
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In 1960, the Supreme Court, in Massey Motors, Inc. v. United
States, held that the useful life of an asset should be determined by
the length of time the taxpayer reasonably expects to use it in his
business, and not by its physical life."9 But Massey does not support
the Commissioner's action in equating the useful life of an asset to
the taxpayer, with the length of time the asset actually is used.2"
Turning from the judicial viewpoint of depreciation to that of the
legislative branch, one may note that Congress has allowed "a reason-
able allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear," since the Revenue
Act of 1913. The tax concept of depreciation is to allow recovery of
the cost of an asset through periodic deductions from ordinary in-
come. Regardless of market appreciation, depreciation (exhaustion,
wear, tear) occurs; it is this expense which Congress intended the
taxpayer to recover. Congress was aware of the possibility of the use
of depreciation deductions for tax avoidance."' However, it was not
until 1962 that Congress responded to the Commissioner's request
to limit the tax reduction effect by enacting section 1245.22 That
section provides for recapture, in the year of sale, of excessive de-
preciation.
Congress intended section 1245 to apply prospectively only.8 The
Commissioner, however, is attempting to apply the principle of sec-
tion 1245 retroactively through Revenue Ruling 62-92. Moreover,
it has been contended that the Commissioner might use Revenue
Ruling 62-92 to disallow depreciation in areas exempted by Section
1245.2' The Commissioner's attempted application of Revenue Ruling
62-92 clearly is out of line with congressional policy. In addition to
violating the already established judicial and legislative precedent,
Revenue Ruling 62-92 violates the government's own regulations.
Those regulations provide, among other things, that an asset may not
be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value, that salvage value
shall be changed only if useful life is unreasonably estimated and not
merely because of changes in price level, and that when an asset is
sold at arms length, recognition of sections 1002 and 1231 should be
given.2 5 Treas. Reg. 1.167 (b) (o) which allows the reasonableness of
19364 U.S. 92 (1960).
2°"[I]t must be borne in mind that even the Commissioner does not contend that a
taxpayer who happens to dispose of some asset before its physical exhaustion must depreciate
it on a useful life equal to the time it was actually held." 364 U.S. at 113 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
21 S & A Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d at 633.
12 See text accompanying notes 40, 41 infra.
2Section 1245 covers certain property disposed of after December 31, 1962.
24 Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue Code,
72 Yale L.J. 1483, 1485 (1963).
2 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.167(a)-i(a), 1.167(a)-1(c) (1964). See note 34 infra for text of
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any claim of depreciation to be determined upon the basis of condi-
tions known to exist at the end of the period, and upon which the
Commissioner also relies, should be read only in light of the above
provisions.
Not only is Revenue Ruling 62-92 contra to the regulations, but
it also contradicts the Commissioner's position in Whitaker v. Com-
missioner." In that case, the taxpayer argued that his salvage value
should be reduced to allow additional depreciation because the sales
price was substantially lower than the adjusted basis. This is of
course the logical conclusion if one interprets Revenue Ruling 62-92
to the effect that actual sales price equals salvage value. But the
Commissioner successfully argued that the reverse application of
Revenue Ruling 62-92 should not be sanctioned. The Commissioner's
position is that if the asset is sold above its adjusted basis, depreciation
is disallowed so that salvage value equals sales price; but if the asset is
sold at a loss, the taxpayer is not allowed to increase his depreciation
so that salvage value equals sales price.
The Commissioner's reliance upon the Cohn case to expand his dis-
allowance of depreciation when the sales price exceeds the beginning
of the year adjusted basis results from a misinterpretation of that
decision. The important facts in Cohn are: (1) the taxpayer failed
to set a salvage value, and (2) only the reasonableness of the last
year's salvage value was in question. 7 In giving its approval to the
district court's determination of the salvage value in the year of sale,
the Sixth Circuit was concerned with a question of fact (whether or
not the salvage value set by the district court was clearly erroneous)
and was not establishing a broad rule of law overturning existing
judicial or legislative authority. Moreover, the fact that the Com-
missioner sought revision of salvage value for reasons other than
market fluctuations shows that the policy the government is now
following was not before the court in Cohn. Finally, it was not until
four years after Cohn that the Commissioner challenged depreciation
in the year of sale solely because an asset's sale price exceeded its first
of year adjusted basis."
When properly limited to its factual holding, the Cohn case stands
for the proposition that salvage value should be adjusted if the esti-
these regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a)-8 (a) (I): "Where an asset is retired by sale at arm's
length, recognition of gain or loss will be subject to the provisions of Section 1002, 1231,
and other applicable provisions of the law."
2o259 F.2d 379 (Sth Cir. 1958).
27 259 F.2d 371, 374, 379.
21 Merritt, Government Briefs in Cohn Refute IRS Disallowance of Year-of-Sale Depre-
ciation, 20 J. Taxation 156 (1964).
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mate was unreasonable when made. In other words, depreciation
allowances should not be disturbed unless the taxpayer fails to set a
salvage value, or employs one which is unreasonable when made.
Thus, the resale value of an asset which has appreciated in value solely
as a result of market conditions would not warrant readjustment of
salvage value. Similarly, the sales price should never be determinative
of salvage value unless the salvage value was unreasonable when esti-
mated and unless the sale was made at or near the end of the useful
life of the asset.29 An anticipated sale before the end of useful life
would have little, if any, relationship to salvage value."
Applying the above principles of depreciation to the factual situa-
tion in Fribourg, one sees that the sale of the asset involved does not
call for a redetermination of salvage value. The depreciation estimates
were reasonable when made. The estimated useful life of the ship sold
was based upon the actual foreseeable use of the asset to the taxpayer.
In addition, the reopening of the Suez Canal caused the market value
of the Liberty-type ships to fall from the originally inflated price to
the point that the salvage value of the Feuer as originally set was a
reasonable estimate. 1 Therefore, the capital gain received by the tax-
payer was attributable solely to market factors and not to an un-
reasonable estimate of depreciation.
As previously stated, the sale of an asset in the middle of its useful
life has little relevance in determining the reasonableness of the sal-
vage value estimate. The taxpayer in Fribourg was approached by a
buyer who was attempting to capitalize upon a development calling
for an increase in use of the Liberty-type ship. The sale, therefore,
was an unanticipated one with a substantial part of the ship's useful
life remaining.
B. Argument In Support Of The Commissioner's Position
The Commissioner's basic position is simply that depreciation de-
ductions should not be allowed in the year of sale when an asset is
sold for more than its adjusted basis at the first of the year of sale.
The reasoning behind this position is that to allow depreciation in
the year of sale is, in effect, to allow the taxpayer to recover, tax-
free, more than the cost of the asset to him. Otherwise stated, the tax-
payer should not be allowed a depreciation deduction when he suffers
29 The reason that a sale at or near the end of the useful life might be relevant in the
determination of the reasonableness of salvage value is that salvage value is by its definition
an estimation of value at the end of the useful life of the asset.
aoMacabe Co., 42 T.C. 1105, 1111 (1965).
" Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5, Fribourg Navigation Co. v. United States, 335 F.2d
15 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
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no loss on the asset." The Supreme Court has said that the purpose of
Congress in establishing depreciation deductions was to allow the
taxpayer to recover the cost of the asset (minus any salvage value);
Congress' intent was not to provide the taxpayer with a means of
tax avoidance."a
The depreciation deduction is a deduction against ordinary income.
If the estimated useful life is too short, if the estimated salvage
value is too low, or if the method of depreciation allows too much
depreciation in the early years, the adjusted basis may be less than
the actual value. When this situation exists, sale of the asset results
in a gain which would be taxed as capital gain, thus allowing what
should be ordinary income to be converted into capital gain."
The government contends that the taxpayer should not be allowed
to avoid taxes in this manner. The government further contends that
it makes no difference whether the excess of sales price over first-of-
year adjusted basis is due to incorrect estimates or to appreciation
due to market fluctuations; the important thing is that the taxpayer
not be allowed a depreciation deduction when the asset has not de-
preciated in value. The passage of section 1245 indicates that Congress
is in agreement with the basic contentions of the government.
This basic position may be reconciled with the applicable Treasury
regulations," for even though salvage value must be estimated, its
2 For example, taxpayer, T, buys a truck for $10,000 on January 1, 1965. He assigns
it a salvage value of $1,000 and a useful life of ten years; the depreciation deduction on a
straight-line basis is $900 a year. On July 1, 1966, he sells the truck for $9,500. Should T
be allowed the depreciation deduction of $450 for the six months he owned the truck in
1966? The truck cost him nothing in the way of depreciation in 1966 because he sold it for
more than its book value on January 1, 1966; to allow the taxpayer to take the depreciation
deduction is to allow him to recover the $450 at capital gains rates rather than ordinary
income. Thus, the taxpayer could use depreciation deductions to avoid taxation.
aaMassey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 101, 107 (1960).
"4U.S. Code Cong., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3398 (1962).
a"Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i(a) (1964) provides in part:
The allowance is that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year
in accordance with a reasonably consistent plan . . . so that the aggregate of
the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end of the estimated
useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or other basis of the
property. . . . An asset shall not be depreciated below a reasonable salvage
value under any method of computing depreciation ...
(Emphasis added.)
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I (b) (1964) provides in part:
[T]he estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life
inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably
be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business. . . . The esti-
mated remaining useful life may be subject to modification by reason of con-
tions known to exist at the end of the taxable year and shall be redetermined
when necessary regardless of the method of computing depreciation. However,
estimated remaining useful life shall be redetermined only when the change
1965s]
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reasonableness may be redetermined on the basis of conditions known
to exist at the end of the period for which the return is made."6 In
the Fribourg case, the actual salvage value (sales price) of the ship
was known a week before the end of the accounting period. 7 It is
unreasonable to continue to follow an estimate when it is known that
the estimate is wrong.as
Furthermore, the Cohn case authorizes a redetermination of salvage
value at or near the end of useful life when there is a substantial
difference in the salvage value estimated at the time of acquisition and
the actual salvage value indicated by the sales price. Doubtless there
is a substantial difference here in the selling price ($699,500) and the
estimated salvage value ($54,000). According to the government's
basic theory, as reflected by Revenue Ruling 62-92, it should make
no difference whether the sale is at the end of useful life or in the
middle. 9
As for the taxpayer's argument that Congress did not intend sec-
tion 1245 and section 1250 to be retroactive and thereby does not
approve of Revenue Ruling 62-92, it should be pointed out that those
sections deal with a much broader problem than depreciation in the
year of sale. They provide for the recapture of depreciation taken
prior to the year of sale. For that reason it cannot be said that dis-
allowance of depreciation in the year of sale is a retroactive applica-
in the useful life is significant and there is a clear and convincing basis for the
redetermination....
(Emphasis added.)
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I (c) (1) (1964) provides in part:
Salvage value is the amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which
is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an asset....
Salvage value shall not be changed at any time after the determination made
at the time of acquisition merely because of changes in price levels. However,
if there is a redetermination of useful life . . . salvage value may be rede-
termined upon facts known at the time of such redetermination of useful life
... in no event shall an asset . . . be depreciated below a reasonable salvage
value ...
(Emphasis added.)
3STreas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-O(a) (1956) provides in part:
[D]eductions for depreciation shall not exceed such amounts as may be
necessary to recover the unrecovered cost or other basis less salvage during
the remaining useful life of the property. The reasonableness of any claim for
depreciation shall be determined upon the basis of conditions known to exist
at the end of the period for which the return is made.
(Emphasis added.)
87335 F.2d at 16.
" The Tax Court has indicated that known conditions at the end of the year would be
good cause to redetermine useful life. Smith Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 37, 47
(1964). It would seem that this same reasoning could be applied to salvage value.
" Useful life was held by the Supreme Court in Massey Motors, 364 U.S. 92, 97, 98, 99,
107 (1960), to be the time the asset is expected to be used by the taxpayer. The govern-
ment would like to have the actual period the taxpayer holds the asset be consideerd its
useful life.
[Vol. 19
tion of those sections. In addition, Congress seems to approve of the
disallowance of depreciation in the year of sale. A committee report
on section 1250 states:
[S]ince in the year real property is sold the actual value of the property
is known, it has been held that depreciation deductions should not be
allowed to the extent they actually reduce the adjusted basis of the
property below the amount actually realized. This provision, in pro-
viding for ordinary income treatment for certain additional deprecia-
tion is not intended to affect this holding.0
C. Sections 1245 And 1250
Much of the conflict presented by the adversary opinions above
has been resolved by sections 1245 and 1250. Section 1245 was added
to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1962 and provides for the "re-
capture" of all depreciation deductions on "section 1245 property" 41
taken since December 31, 1961. The provision accomplishes this pur-
pose by treating as ordinary income any gain on the sale of the asset
to the amount of depreciation taken after 1961. Any amount realized
on the sale above the amount of depreciation taken since 1961 is
taxed at capital gains rates. The cut-off date of December 31, 1961,
is one factor that makes Fribourg and its companion cases important.
Many depreciable assets were sold before that date and much litiga-
tion concerning those sales is pending.
Section 1250 is more limited in scope than section 1245, but covers
buildings and real property not subject to section 1245. This section
provides for full recapture if the property is held for twelve months
or less; thereafter, the section recaptures only that amount of de-
preciation which exceeds the straight line depreciation. If the property
is held for more than twenty months, the excess depreciation is re-
duced by one percentage point for each month over twenty the
property is held. Hence, if the property is held for ten years, there
will be no recapture of depreciation."
IV. CONCLUSION
The taxpayer contends that since the asset sold bore a salvage value
reasonable when made and since the gain from the sale resulted solely
from market conditions, Revenue Ruling 62-92 should not deprive
40S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1964).
41 "Section 1245 property" is (a) personal property, (b) other tangible property (not
including a building or its structural components) which is an integral part of certain busi-
nesses, or (c) an elevator or escalator. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1245(a) (3).
42 For a more detailed explanation see, Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section
1245 of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L.J. 1483 (1963).
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